Legal Incentives For Reduction, Reuse, And Recycling: A New Approach To Hazardous Waste Management Roberta G. Gordon
Although hazardous waste is one of the nation's most serious problems, neither the states nor the federal government has developed an optimal solution. Current hazardous waste laws and management practices are based on two misguided notions: that sustained hazardous waste production is inevitable, and that disposal-oriented technology is a panacea for hazardous waste problems and therefore should be the focus of legal and scientific attention. Several states have begun to reject these assumptions and have enacted laws encouraging reduction, reuse, and recycling. No state, however, has enacted a set of laws that sufficiently encourages this practice of waste reduction, or "source reduction," as a viable competitor to the disposal approach to hazardous waste management.
This Note analyzes the inadequacy of current approaches and proposes a model legislative package for managing hazardous waste based on reduction, reuse, and recycling.' The proposal is addressed primarily to those state and federal legislators and environmental protection agency staff who have discovered that current disposal-oriented hazardous waste management practices-even those at the forefront of modern day technology-have failed to protect society adequately from the very substantial costs of hazardous waste production. This Note offers an alternative approach and invites debate on what is a more effective solution for coping with the problem of hazardous waste. In fact, neither statute contains extensive incentives for generators to produce less waste. 12 For instance, CERCLA funds its Superfund landfill cleanup program through the collection of a tax on the production of petroleum feedstocks and specialized chemicals 3 -substances that only indirectly and to different degrees lead to hazardous waste generation."' As a result, many companies that generate hazardous waste do not now pay the Superfund tax. 1 5 Therefore, the tax does not influence these generators to reduce waste or to use alternatives to land disposal. 12. The current regulatory structure does not directly encourage safer and more permanent solutions than land disposal, but instead provides indirect disincentives for such alternatives. TECHNOLO-GIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 16. These disincentives include the absence of financial responsibility requirements for corrective action if hazardous waste is released from an operating landfill, id., and the 30-year limitation for post-closure requirements at land disposal sites, 40 C.F.R. § § 264.117, 265.117 (1985) , when 500 years may be realistic as a period of concern about hazardous wastes in landfills. NAT Conversely, increasing costs of waste management, due partially to federal hazardous waste regulatory programs, have indirectly provided incentives for waste reduction. "The indirect approach, however, does not appear to produce positive results extensive enough and fast enough to substantially impact national waste management practices." TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 74.
Furthermore, the amendments to RCRA enacted in November 1984,0 which declare a national policy of waste reduction" 1 and give EPA authority to restrict landfilling, 22 are insufficient to encourage reduction, reuse, and recycling because they provide no positive incentives for these practices. Although the landfill restrictions, assuming EPA actually implements them, may create new supplies of reusable waste by making available quantities of hazardous waste previously placed in landfills, 2 3 the amendments fail to encourage the development of markets for the waste.
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More importantly, the amendments provide no inducements for the development or use of optimal waste minimization techniques in lieu of comparably less desirable post-production technologies, such as ocean dumping, incineration, or chemical treatment." 5 Unless the new national policy spurs additional legislation on waste reduction, the federal solution will remain aimed almost entirely at containing or removing hazardous waste after production and disposal.
B. Problems With the Current Approach
There are serious limitations to the current federal approach to hazardous waste, which relies primarily on waste management and disposal in-16; Hirschhorn, supra note 16, at 142, 143. If the program becomes more stringent, comprehensive, and better enforced, these incentives are likely to increase. See id. at 143. Conversely, if enforcement remains inadequate, and the RORA regulations remain insufficient to protect public health and the environment, as their critics charge, waste generators and managers will continue to pay less than the full cost of hazardous waste generation. See id. at 142.
20
. See HSWA, supra note 19, at § § 1-704. 21 . Id. at § 101(b). "National Policy-The Congress hereby declares it to be the national policy of the United States that, wherever feasible, the generation of hazardous waste is to be reduced or eliminated as expeditiously as possible." Id. This is to be accomplished "by encouraging process substitution, materials recovery, properly conducted recycling and reuse, and treatment. . . ." Id. 22 . Id. at § 201(a). Section 201(a)(d)-(a)(g) prohibits land disposal of federally listed hazardous waste unless EPA determines that protection of human health and the environment does not require such a prohibition. These determinations are to be made on a schedule beginning in 1986 and spanning several more years. Id. The Act allows EPA extensions for making these decisions. Id. at § 201(a)(h); see Skinner, Banning Waste From Land Disposal, at 3, in papers presented by EPA at the First Public Briefing on the 1984 Amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Video Teleconference (Dec. 11, 1984) .
23. See infra notes 24, 46. 24. Supplies will be created from the waste that was previously landfilled, but the amendments do not provide for the fate of this supply. Also, EPA has discretion in imposing the landfill ban, see, e.g., HSWA, supra note 19, at § 201(a)(d), and there is a distinct possibility that, if implemented at all, it will take years for the amendments to be effective. Telephone interview with Dr. Joel S. Hirschhorn, supra note 11.
25. These less desirable technologies have environmental costs. Incineration, for example, contributes to toxic air pollution. Despite these facts, special interest groups in Washington are discussing ways to circumvent the amendments' disposal restrictions, specifically by finding new loopholes in the regulations, and by resorting to other controversial disposal methods such as ocean dumping and exporting of hazardous waste. Telephone interview with Dr. Joel S. Hirschhorn, supra note 11; cf UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, THE STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT 1983: SE-LECTED Topics 9 (1983) (developing countries vulnerable to hazardous waste exports). stead of waste reduction. 28 First, the approach rests on an assumption that safe methods exist to contain hazardous waste on land, and that there are technical solutions once contamination of the environment has occurred. 27 Scientific studies suggest that this assumption is unwarranted. In fact, "[t]he weight of scientific evidence indicates that land disposal of hazardous waste will sooner or later jeopardize public health." 2 Even state-ofthe-art land disposal facilities will eventually leak and possibly contaminate groundwater during the decades or centuries that some hazardous chemicals remain dangerous.
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Second, the system overlooks future unknown costs for the immediate benefit of disposal. By minimizing present waste management costs, greater costs associated with cleanup are postponed to the future and may be shifted away from the private to the public sector, 30 Fourth, EPA's failure to remedy widespread lack of compliance with RORA and the exceedingly high costs of CEROLA remedial action bring into question the viability of current regulatory programs. For instance, the General Accounting Office has estimated that in some states, 78% of hazardous waste facilities were out of compliance with RORA landfill regulations in 1 9 8 3 .11 Correspondingly, the Office of Technology Assessment has estimated that to clean up approximately 10,000 of the presently known uncontrolled hazardous waste sites will cost the nation several hundred billion dollars, as compared with the $1.6 billion that was collected under CERCLA for this purpose through 1985." 9 Finally, in some instances treatment and disposal costs to industry are higher than the costs associated with alternative methods. 4 The reduction, reuse, and recycling approach is the best long-term solution to the problem of hazardous waste and is a companion to limited disposal. Source reduction is based on two premises: first, that reducing production and disposal of hazardous waste will reduce unwanted risk; and second, that because of limited natural resources, it is unwise for a society to dispose of everything it produces. Source reduction is an alternative to end-of-pipe treatment of hazardous waste and to perpetual storage in or on land. It can be accomplished by both (1) modification of industrial processes within a plant resulting in decreased generation of hazardous waste; and (2) recycling and reuse processes that may occur on or off the site of the particular generating plant. 47 For some companies, reduction, reuse, and recycling will be economically efficient in the short run. 48 And as a long-run strategy, source reduc- 42. It has been estimated that greater use of alternatives to land disposal "could increase industry's near-term costs significantly, perhaps by as much as 50 to 100 percent." TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 6; cf. id. at 14 (land disposal is still low-cost option under current regulations for most hazardous waste) (emphasis added); Hirschhorn, supra note 16, at 142 (land disposal is lowest cost, most widely used waste management option). "But years or decades from now, cleaning up a site from which there are hazardous releases, and compensating victims, might cost 10 to 100 times the additional costs incurred today to prevent releases of hazardous materials." TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 6. Viewing the costs of land disposal in this way employs the concept of environmental equivalence. See supra note 40.
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B. Setting Goals and Overcoming Obstacles to Source Reduction Legislation
Source reduction legislation should serve twin objectives. First, the legislation should be based upon those policies that lead to the most effective reduction, reuse, and recycling strategies. Second, the legislation should be pollution levels at the same time that they raise firm profits. designed to overcome several obstacles responsible for the limited use of source reduction to date.
See TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES

Ambiguous Regulatory Programs and Priorities
The crisis-" and disposal-oriented approaches of both existing hazardous waste laws and industry's response to these laws have been barriers to source reduction. 55 Coupled with confusing, constantly changing, and often unenforced regulations,"' these obstacles have frustrated long-term planning for waste reduction and have reinforced dependence on disposal. 57 One aim of source reduction legislation must therefore be to design incentives, including the facilitation of markets, that clearly encourage industry's use of source reduction over less preferable waste management techniques. Furthermore, the legislation should give priority to waste reduction over reuse and recycling. 5 Only reduction directly eliminates the production of hazardous waste and is therefore the most effective of the three in minimizing risks to health and the environment. 55. Finkel, Economic and Regulatory Incentives for Hazardous Waste Reduction in Massachusetts, in 1983 MASSACHUSETTS CONFERENCE, supra note 15, at 48; see also TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 17 (until private sector perceives regulatory structure as not containing bias in favor of land disposal, investment in new technologies will be limited); cf. NRC REPORT, supra note 54, at 21 (discrepancy between true cost and current cost of land disposal must be addressed to promote waste reduction).
56. Finkel, supra note 55, at 48; NRC DIGEST, supra note 48, at 10 ("[T]he current trend toward stronger implementation of [RCRA] must continue if reduction efforts are to be maximized.").
57.
Finkel, supra note 55, at 48; see NRC DIGEST, supra note 48, at 9 ("Industrial firms are less likely to make definite plans for waste reduction in the face of uncertainty."). The unpredictability of the RCRA regulatory program delays commitments to undertake waste reduction practices and hinders implementation of reduction programs already begun. NRC REPORT, supra note 54, at 32. 
See
Feasibility Questions
Although further research is needed to demonstrate technical and economic feasibility, 60 current predictions indicate that existing technologies for source reduction can eliminate between thirty and eighty percent of hazardous waste entering landfills. 61 Not only does source reduction appear to be technically feasible, but past accomplishments bolster the conclusion that reduction presently is economically viable as well. For example, several larger waste generators are beginning to introduce waste minimization processes. The 3M Company, for instance, has saved over $150 million through its use of such techniques worldwide. 62 Similarly, smaller generators are now saving money by selling wastes through exchanges rather than paying fees for disposal. 6 "
Larger firms, however, are generally better equipped than their smaller counterparts to research and implement optimal waste reduction technologies." Thus, for waste reduction strategies to be implemented on a large scale, a source reduction program must address capital and research-anddevelopment needs of smaller firms.
Information Deficiencies
The most significant barrier to the use of source reduction could be lack of knowledge." 5 More and better information must be readily available if industry and policy makers are to evaluate accurately the potential benefits of source reduction.
6 6 Information can also serve a critical role in demonstrating to industry and the public that source reduction is feasible. 
Industry Opposition
As discussed above, industry opposition to source reduction is due in part to unawareness that reduction is feasible for many wastes. 69 It also results from fears that autonomy and trade secrets could be jeopardized by programs that delve into the specifics of production processes. 70 Furthermore, industry opposition may emanate from risk-aversion-7 1 -that is, both executives and workers resist the prospect of increased near-term costs and uncertain economic benefits, 7 2 as well as change in their routinized behavior.7 Because the success of a source reduction program may depend upon industry support, legislation must address these concerns, such as by providing incentives for voluntary waste reduction efforts and by minimizing direct regulation.
III. THE REDUCTION PROPOSAL
Currently, only six states have enacted significant legislation on hazardous waste source reduction, 7 4 with no state using all the legal incentives available. The model law advocated in this Note attempts to synthesize the particular strengths of each state's legislation and to address the hazardous waste problem through a comprehensive legislative approach. The proposal employs both regulatory and non-regulatory mechanisms and encompasses four critical areas: planning, research, institutional assistance, and statutory and regulatory adjustments.
A. Planning
Planning includes developing a guiding government policy on source reduction and a scheme for policy implementation. Planning is necessary to address the complexity of the hazardous waste problem and to accommodate regional differences and varying state resources 7 5 for coping with 69. See Finkel, supra note 55, at 46; supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text; infra note 111. 70. Waste reduction gives a competitive advantage if waste management costs are a significant fraction of production costs. NRC REPORT, supra note 54, at 25. Many firms are thus reluctant to release information on reduction technologies. Id. The confidentiality problem varies between industries, but particularly inhibits adoption of waste reduction by small businesses, which are without the resources to explore such opportunities individually. Id. at 25-26. This problem may be best dealt with by the creation of centralized government programs for R & D and information dissemination. See also infra text accompanying notes 107-08.
71. "Reduction in generation of hazardous waste may be impeded because of a tendency in industry to select proven production technologies rather than alternatives that may generate less waste." NRC DIGEST, supra note 48, at 4; see also Finkel, supra note 55, at 47 (smaller firms particularly risk-averse).
72 To assure implementation of these delineated priorities, the legislation should provide that the non-regulatory agency responsible for implementing the source reduction program" prepare a hazardous waste plan" 0 for the region based on alternatives to land disposal. In setting forth source reduction goals and recommendations on strategies to achieve these goals, the plan can serve as a cohesive policy guide for government, and as a demonstration to industry and the public of a new emphasis on waste reduction." 1
B. Research
Research on source reduction is necessary because source reduction is a relatively new approach to hazardous waste management, with marketing different industries. and technological waste reduction techniques still being developed. 2 Because the high financial costs to generators of disposal have only recently-and even now, only partially-been imposed, 3 generators mistakenly continue to believe that land disposal will remain the cheapest management alternative. This misconception has stifled private incentives to research source reduction, making government intervention necessary to ensure that such research actually occurs." 4 Legislation mandating research on source reduction can vest research authority in a government agency 8 5 or provide for agency-administered grants to universities and industry. 8 Research efforts should be aimed initially at generating the information necessary to implement currently available waste reduction technologies, and then-to assure that waste reduction continues-at developing new techniques. 87 Legislation for a research program" 8 should therefore provide for an initial assessment of the 82. See TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 2, at 9 (data needed on alternative industrial processes for waste reduction); Clark 1986) (Department of Ecology to study methods to achieve waste reduction).
86. See, e.g., infra note 125 (discussing Minnesota's program for research grants to industry). However, "[a]lthough R & D may occur within the private sector, it will do little to advance waste reduction efforts on a larger scale unless information is freely exchanged." Clark, supra note 82, at 7. Because many firms are reluctant to release information, supra note 70, concentrating at least a portion of research monies within universities appears desirable. On the other hand, while agencies and industries tend to work toward quick results on source reduction research, university contractors may be constrained by such factors as the academic year and the need to publish. Telephone interview with Terry Pierson, Staff member of North Carolina Board of Science and Technology (Mar. 5, 1985). Thus a balanced approach to research, involving both universities and industry, is needed. Id.
87. See NRC REPORT, supra note 54, at 36-37 (current need to encourage adoption of existing source reduction methods, but as more reduction occurs, new techniques will need development).
88. North Carolina, through its "Pollution Prevention Pays" program, may be the leading state in waste reduction research. In July 1983, the state allocated $600,000 over two years to the North Carolina Board of Science and Technology for research and technical assistance to industry. types and amounts of waste streams generated by industries within the jurisdiction, 9 estimates of future waste streams, 90 and an analysis of the best methods for each industry to reduce these streams given current technology. 91 Each waste should also be studied generically, to determine the degree and type of difficulties encountered reducing or reusing particular wastes.
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Non-regulatory, voluntary waste minimization projects will win approval by a risk-averse industry only if research efforts produce comprehensive feasibility studies and economic analyses. 93 
C. Institutional Assistance
The third critical area within a comprehensive legislative approach-institutional assistance for source reduction-includes the creation and empowerment of governmental agencies and other institutions charged with promoting waste minimization. Institutional assistance is in- 
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dispensable because markets alone have failed adequately to encourage reduction and discourage disposal. Institutional assistance also facilitates necessary central coordination of source reduction. For example, the expertise required to choose the most effective waste minimization strategies for a particular plant may be too costly for each generator to develop individually 9 7 and may be obtained more efficiently by a government body. This is particularly true for the multiple and diverse small quantity generators, who need technical assistance on waste reduction that only a central institution can provide. 8 A comprehensive source reduction program includes both regulatory functions, such as enforcing disposal restrictions, 9 " and non-regulatory functions, such as providing information to industry. 1 00 To retain maximum industry support for source reduction, the legislation should provide that these functions be separated. Authority for the program thus should be divided between a regulatory body, such as a state Environmental Protection Agency, and a non-regulatory body, such as a government corporation. 1 01 In addition, an Advisory Council representing diverse interests should report to the responsible agencies and the legislature on, for example, suggested changes in the waste reduction program. 1 02 97. Runge, supra note 48, at 115, 128.
Id.
99.
See infra text accompanying notes 115-17. 100. See N.C. Bd. of Science and Technology, Informational Pamphlet, supra note 88, at 1-2 (regulatory and non-regulatory functions needed); Hickman, Industrial Waste Prevention: An Assessment and Demonstration in the Region of Waterloo, Ontario, in 1984 MASSACHUSETrS CONFER-ENCE, supra note 51, at 27 (cooperative approach and adequate regulatory framework needed). Overcash, supra note 40, at 69, asserts that the government role should be restricted to evaluating the environmental ramifications of different approaches and to ensuring that maximum use is made of waste elimination. This, however, is not an argument against regulatory controls as a complement to a strong non-regulatory incentive structure, as regulatory controls can result in increased waste reduction. "[A] strong regulatory program is essential since it raises the costs of managing residuals and provides an incentive for generators of waste to find ways to minimize these costs." N.C. Bd. of Science and Technology, Informational Pamphlet, supra note 88, at 1; see also NRC DiGEST, supra note 48, at 3 (waste reduction most likely fostered by non-regulatory methods such as information dissemination programs and economic incentives, but regulatory standards will be strong impetus in undertaking waste reduction efforts).
101. This structure has been effective in New York, as evidenced by support for the program by both trade associations and environmentalists. Telephone interview with Pickett Simpson, Hazardous Waste Program Manager for the New York Environmental Facilities Corporation (Aug. 14, 1984). Likewise, Minnesota's Waste Management Board, with responsibility for the state's source reduction program, is separate from the agency having regulatory authority over hazardous wastes. Decker, Waste Reduction Programs in Minnesota, in 1984 MASSACHUSETTS CONFERENCE, supra note 51, at 30. This is not the case in California, where the Department of Health Services exercises regulatory and non-regulatory functions. This structure assumes, most likely falsely, that industry will vigorously undertake voluntary waste reduction projects with the help of the same government body by which it is regulated. Thus, California's approach would not seem to encourage voluntary adoption of source reduction to the same extent as when regulatory and non-regulatory functions are separated.
102. The Council should include members with different interests and concerns over hazardous waste, such as representatives from business, industry, universities, environmental groups, and the general public. See ILL. ANN In order to facilitate the creation of markets for reusable waste, 0 3 the legislation also should grant the non-regulatory body responsibility for a "cpassive" waste exchange, 1°" which would operate as a clearinghouse to match up generators who have waste to sell with purchasers who can use the waste as raw material. 10 5 The government can also operate an "active" exchange, which, unlike the "passive" model, would take physical possession of the waste.
10 6 To gain industry support for the waste exchange, as well as for any other aspect of the source reduction program where the confidentiality of sensitive production or waste minimization processes could be at stake, 10 7 legislation should provide strong protec- . Federal law should thus be amended to provide that in the event of a sale through an exchange to a bona fide purchaser, the liability for the waste is transferred to the purchaser and the original generator's liability ceases.
106. New York's successful exchanges, see supra note 105, provide a good model for government involvement in waste exchanges. The state, unlike most others, both aggressively runs its own active exchange and contributes funds to a regional passive exchange that operates across several states. See generally N.Y. STATE ENVIRONMENTAL FACILIrIEs CORP., INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS RECYCLING ACT PROGRAM SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 2, 3-7 (1983) (describing New York's exchanges). The administrative decision to participate in a regional exchange, rather than to create a wholly new exchange, should depend on a state's size and waste generation patterns.
107. Examples are technical assistance and information exchange programs. See, e.g., WASH.
tions'°8 for industry trade secrets.' 09 This may be accomplished through nondisclosure agreements and procedures, and by penalties against program staff for improperly and intentionally disclosing confidential information. However, complete information on wastes, waste economics, and source reduction technology "is not present in most firms."" ' Because of firms' reluctance to transfer information about advantageous waste reduction processes among themselves, it is essential that institutional assistance for source reduction include legislation authorizing technical assistance to industry for waste minimization."' To encourage voluntary industry adoption of state-of-the-art technologies, this program should be nonregulatory and incorporate research efforts and university expertise." 2 Elements of a technical assistance program include workshops for specific industries and waste streams; the development of management plans for industrial waste streams; and on-site consultation." 3
D. Statutory and Regulatory Adjustments
Statutory and regulatory adjustments... constitute the fourth area within a comprehensive legislative approach. Such adjustments can compensate for the failure of markets sufficiently to encourage source reduction and can correct statutory and regulatory frameworks that provide few incentives for reduction and inadequate penalties for disposal. Such adjustments also are necessary to reflect a new policy emphasis on waste minimization.
For instance, although Congress gave EPA the authority to ban federally listed hazardous waste from land disposal in the recent RCRA amendments, 15 comparable restrictions on the state level are still justified. The states often designate many substances as hazardous that the federal government does not. 1 8 There are thus many potentially dangerous materials-from the states' view-excluded from the congressional ban. To encourage reduction in waste generation to the lowest feasible levels, it is appropriate to place the burden of overcoming a presumption in favor of reduction on industry-the only party in a position actually to reduce generation and minimize disposal. Legislation therefore should provide that all state-listed hazardous waste is banned from land disposal unless industry demonstrates to the responsible regulatory agency that, considering technological and economic feasibility, specific waste cannot be reasonably reduced, reused, recycled, incinerated, or treated, and must be landfilled. 117 114. Statutory and regulatory "adjustments" can be contrasted with the creation of wholly new institutional programs, such as research and technical assistance programs.
115. See supra note 22; text accompanying notes 20-25. 116. See supra note 26 (significant disparity between wastes federally regulated and total amount regulated). State land disposal regulations are also justified because the federal ban will probably not be implemented for many years. See supra note 24; infra note 117. In fact, the federal legislation appears to be modeled on state law, as evidenced by the amendments' mandate for early EPA review of a series of wastes identical to the wastes banned from land disposal in California. A tax on disposal-a waste-end tax-should be used in tandem with disposal restrictions, and can be designed to tax generators, or owners and operators of hazardous waste disposal facilities, or both. " 8 By internalizing the true cost of land disposal within hazardous waste industries, such a tax may be critical in encouraging the use and development of feasible reduction techniques and in discouraging disposal.' 1 9 But to have that effect, the tax must be high enough to have an impact on those taxed, 20 employ a variable rate according to the toxicity of the material discarded, and if the tax is generator-based, exempt material to be reused or recycled. 21 The proceeds may be used to fund cleanup efforts 22 as well as the overall reduction and recycling program. 2 Neither disposal restrictions nor waste-end taxes, however, address industry's initial costs and investment uncertainties in undertaking waste reduction. A comprehensive, positive economic incentive program for California's system does not encourage source reduction to as great an extent as does Illinois': California requires only a post hoc rationalization from industry after disposal of recyclable waste, while Illinois actually prevents such disposal. Illinois' structure is also preferable to that of the new federal restrictions promulgated in the RCRA amendments. See supra note 22. First, the criteria used to determine whether a waste should be banned from disposal under federal law-protection of human health and the environment-although an important goal, does little to affirmatively promote waste minimization. Moreover, using this criteria may be a false assurance to the public, because given current technology, any landfill will leak. See supra note 27. Furthermore, the amendments place the discretion to make the decisions on EPA-an agency that is overburdened, known for delay, and subject to enormous political pressure. At best, such a system invites many years of uncertainty over the permissibility of land disposal. 120. Although a tax on waste might be instituted on the federal level, special interests may lobby to make it so low as to have no effect. Should this be the case, escalation of public concern over the growing Superfund problem, resulting in public pressure on industry, may actually serve the same purpose as the tax in reducing disposal. I27 to encourage industry to explore the economic and technical feasibility of source reduction. The role of positive incentives is particularly pronounced where firms are small. Positive inducements provide funding for initial capital costs and technical expertise, which may be already available to larger firms. This financing may be crucial in promoting firm decisions to make waste minimization process changes that will yield overall profits.
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E. Implementation
The four components of this legislative approach to source reduction-planning, research, institutional assistance, and statutory and regulatory adjustments-work as an integrated whole. While each describes a conceptually discrete set of programs, each of the four depends on the other three for successful implementation. For example, an institution's effectiveness in rendering technical assistance to industry depends upon an active research program to develop applicable technologies. The scope of the research program in turn relies upon the particular source reduction 124. While a waste-end tax may act as a disincentive to landfilling, positive economic incentives can reward those businesses that engage in source reduction. G. BULANOWSM plan developed within a broader hazardous waste management scheme, and upon an institution to carry out the program. The magnitude of the research effort can also be contingent upon funds obtained through statutory adjustments creating a tax on waste. Ultimately, however, the success of the entire reduction program relies upon a planning decision that reduction is to be a high priority.
CONCLUSION
Federal laws have failed to identify methods of alleviating the source of the hazardous waste problem-that is, needlessly high levels of production and disposal-and instead have focused on finding legal solutions after toxic pollution has already been created. Even with the enactment of the recent RCRA amendments, the fatal flaw of federal laws continues to be their failure to provide adequate incentives for waste elimination in a world ill-equipped to cope with toxic substances safely. Reducing the threat of hazardous waste is clearly a national priority. Source reduction legislation, as proposed in this Note,"" is by far the most promising means available to achieve this end.
129. The legislative proposal for reduction, reuse, and recycling advocated in this Note could be used selectively to fill gaps in current federal law, or where appropriate, could be enacted in its entirety as a state package. Ideally, the program should be enacted and initially funded at the federal level, with responsibility for implementation and a portion of funding delegated to the states upon a showing of sufficient state capability. This would ensure a national focus for source reduction, while allowing states the flexibility to design programs suited to their regional needs.
Even under current federal law, RCRA could be interpreted to give EPA the authority to research source reduction. See supra note 10. To achieve a comprehensive federal program for waste reduction, however, the other elements of the proposed approach-programs for planning, institutional assistance, and statutory and regulatory adjustments-must be enacted. EPA and Congress should consider this proposal in response to the RCRA amendments' call for an agency study on the desirability of "taking other additional [federal] actions" to reduce hazardous waste. See HSWA, supra note 19, at § 224(c).
